A bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons
Published in Nature Climate Change, 2013
Recommended citation: Vítor V. Vasconcelos, Francisco C. Santos, and Jorge M. Pacheco. "A bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons" Nature Climate Change (2013) 3 9 p797-801 https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate1927
We investigate the emergence and impact of different types of sanctioning to deter non-cooperative behaviour in climate agreements. We show that a bottom-up approach, in which parties create local institutions that punish free-riders, promotes the emergence of widespread cooperation, mostly when risk perception is low, as it is at present. Global institutions provide, at best, marginal improvements regarding overall cooperation. Our results clearly suggest that a polycentric approach involving multiple institutions is more effective than that associated with a single, global one."
Recommended citation: Vítor V. Vasconcelos, Francisco C. Santos, and Jorge M. Pacheco. “A bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons” Nature Climate Change (2013) 3 9 p797-801